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ALTRUISM AND SOCIAL EXCHANGE
THEORY: THE VICARIOUS REWARDS
OF THE ALTRUIST*
James M. Honeycutt
Purdue University
The position is taken that the altruistic person who is giving a
reward to another is in a one-up or dominating position. The
person receiving the reward is in a submissive role by virtue of
acceptance of the reward. They may even feel that the reward
is a cost if they are unable to reciprocate. Equity may enter
into the context as the target of the altruism seeks to reestablish
balance. While altruistic behavior may not result in immediate
reward on the part of the "rewarder," there may be delayed or
vicarious reward.
It has been a considerable point of critical debate that social
exchange theory and altruistic behavior are diametrically opposed
concepts (Chadwick-Jones, 1976:251). If people are seeking to
maximize rewards and minimize costs in interpersonal relation-
ships, then how can we account for the variance of altruistic
intentions or that helping behavior which is prevalent in some
situations such that there appears to be the dispensing of a reward
rather than the dispenser receiving a reward. It is the intent of
this analysis, to posit that while at one level, altruistic behavior
is indeed the giving up of a resource or reward and at another
level, it encompasses the receiving of different types of "gifts."
Thibault-and Kelley -(1959) used the term.vvfatecontrol,"
to refer to a condition where one person has power over another
and is in a position to allocate rewards to the self, irrespective
of the choice of action by the other. Thus, altruism may be viewed
as a situation whereby the actor dispenses rewards to the other
and also receives vicarious rewards by virtue of being in a position
where resources can be allocated to the other. A person with fate
*1 would like to thank Dr. Ralph Webb of the Department of Communica-
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paper.
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control over another can direct to the self a greater share of re-
wards and decide whether to withhold rewards or make them
available.
Generalized Equity Theory
According to equity theory, individuals try to maximize
their profits (Profit = rewards/cost) or minimize deficients (Wal-
ster, Berscheid, and Walster, 1973). When a person is in an in-
equitable relationship by virtue of unequal distribution of re-
sources, the person may become distressed and attempt to restore
equity. For example, when a person of perceived high status
gives a reward to a lower status person, the lower status person
may feel embarrassed and distressed if rewards continue to be
dispensed such that the lower status person is in a position where
equitable reciprocation is not possible. If a person receives too
many rewards, dissatisfaction may result (Baron, 1966) and
people who lack the resources to reciprocate may also feel resent-
ful of the rewarder (Gergen, 1969).
The act of rewarding another, can increase self-esteem since
the fact of being able to reward B is indicative of A's having the
resources for allocation. Consider the case where A helps B such
that the relationship becomes inequitable because of B's cumula-
tive indebtedness to A. B can attempt to restore balance by
giving A another reward or by justification of the previous helping
behavior that A allocated to B. If B has the ability to repay, he
or she will probably use compensation as the technique of equity
restoration; if B doesn't have the ability to repay, he or she might
use justification. Triandis (1977) indicates that -in interpe~sonal
encounters, interactants are Il?-0re likely to accept "gifts" that can
be reciprocated.
With regards to altruistic behavior by A, B may not per-
ceive such intent as being altruistically motivated. Triandis cites
an example whereby P gives 0 some money, but 0 perceives
the action as a bribe which is not rewarding to o. If A gives
a reward to B that B is unable to repay, inequity may result and
B may not feel rewarded. Thus, altruistic behavior at a super-
ficial level, may not be perceived as rewarding to B at a more
covert level. Also, perceptions of rewards and costs are difficult
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to identify since they are contingent on individual orientation
in relation to the other.
Locus ofControl .
Kanfer (1979) posits that training people to have an altruistic
orientation consists of helping a person to alter the probability
of the highly preferred and generally more immediately rewarded
response in favor of a response that has an initially lower prob-
ability because it is less immediately rewarding or gratifying.
Kanfer indicates that a motivational base other than the incentive
of benefit for the other must be provided. This means the avail-
ability of external support and reinforcement to help the indivi-
dual to incorporate criteria for altruistic behavior. Social approval
or recognition may provide such motivation. Kanfer (p.237)
states with regards to altruistic training that "in a sense, the task,
as in self-control, is to train persons to act for the benefits of
another because it is in their own self-interest." In and of itself,
protection of one's self-interest may either be rewarding or costly
in the interim, but in the long term analysis, there may be a
higher probability of rewarded response. Altruism may result in
delayed return rewards to the initial rewarder such that cost may
be incurred immediately after the fact, but the rewards come to
negate the cost later on such that there is a perceived profit of
rewards over costs.
Determinants ofInterpersonal Behavior (Triandis, 1977)
-
It has been hypothesized that interpersonal behavior is a
function of behavioral intentions and habits. Triandis (1977)
posits a formula (I =Ws(S) + Wa(A) + Wc(C)) where I refers to
intention, S is social factors such as norms, roles, and contrac-
tual arrangements, and C is perceived consequences as a result of
the behavior and the value or affect attached to that consequence.
Thus, behavioral intentions are conceptualized as a function of
social factors, affect, and the value to the actor of the perceived
consequences of the behavior.
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The formula above is designed to predict behavioral inten-
tions which is a component of the probability determinants for
an act or behavior. Triandis expresses this formula as: Pa = (Wh .
H + Wi . I). F. Pa is the probability of an act, H refers to the
strength of the habit to emit the act, I is the behavioral intention
to emit the act, and F is the individual's ability to emit the act fa
(facilitating conditions).' '
The C component under the intention formula will carry
a large weight if altruistic behavior is being considered. by the
actor. While this has not been empirically tested, there appears
to be more than sufficient theoretical foundation to make the
hypothesis. The A component should also carry a large weight
as the pleasantness of the altruism is considered. Thus, altruism
may result in a situation whereby the weighting of the A and
C components in the Triandis model is larger in comparison to
the S component.
Perceived Dimensions ofInterpersonal Relations
Wish, Deutsch, and Kaplan (1976) have found that people
generally think of relationships along four major dimensions.
1. Cooperative and Friendly vs. Competitive and Hostile
(This dimension was found to be more important for
evaluating other's relationships rather than one's own.):
2. Equal vs. Unequal.
3~ Intense _vs. Superficial C~his dimension is more impor-
tant in evaluating one's own relationships.)
4. Socioemotional and Informal vs. Task-oriented and Formal
The dimensions all interact with one another and in some
relationships, one dimension may be more prevalent than the
others. For example, spouses are perceived as tending toward
equality and being cooperative/friendly, while a parent and child
are seen as cooperative/friendly but also as unequal. One could
postulate that altruistic intentions are more along a cooperative
and friendly continuum. However, the equal/unequal dimensions
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could have some influence in altruism in that A who is displaying
altruism toward B, is in a position of dominance (with respect to
the resource given) by virtue of the dissemination of the resource.
Future research is needed to examine perceived dimensions of
altruistic behavior which has been hypothesized here.
Millar and Rogers' Dimension ofDominance
Millar and Rogers (1976) define control as being concerned
with "who has the right to direct, delimit, and defme the actions
of the interpersonal system in the presently experienced spatio-
temporal situation." In essence, the argument is made that domi-
nance is concerned with the amount of time that a person asserts
relational definitions to the other in which the other accepts.
A person is said to be in a one-up position when he or she
attempts to assert definitional rights and a person is in a one-
down position when they request or accept the other's definition.
It is possible that the transactional codes of an altruistic intention
could be conceptualized as one-up. One-down would characterize
an altruistic person in a position to assert a relational definition.
Thus, the person who is the target of the altruism, accepts the
resource and the definition whereby he or she is in a one-down
position or in a submissive role. Attempts to restore equity and
exhibit more one-up moves may follow if the facilitating condi-
tions are present or where the altruism can effectively be recipro-
cated. Exchanges of upward or downward movements may be seen
as attempts to maintain or achieve equilibrium and equity. In
some
situations, too many upward movements may destroy equity such
that perceptions of an altruistic intention, that A has toward B,
may be perceived as costly to B and thus no attribution of altru-
ism is made in regards to A's original intention.
Implications and Conclusions
Altruism can be included under the auspices of social
exchange theory. Limitations to its application involve concrete
definitions of rewards or resources and whether immediate grati-
fication is necessary. The rewards' to two individuals may be
97
Mid-American Review of Sociology
clearly separable since the welfare of one person provides a re-
ward to the other and that one can be concerned with one's own
and another's welfare (Sawyer, 1966).
Berkowitz and Friedman (1967) suggest that altruism will
be facilitated if it has been the person's previous experience that
he or she has also been helped in a smiliar situation. While ex-
change theory and altruistic behavior may appear at one level to
be opposing concepts, there is a possibility of compatible integra-
tion. Behaviors that are done without hope of return benefits may
be explained as deriving pleasure from past benefits that one has
received from others when he or she was in a position of depen-
dency (e.g., the loaning of money to a friend or for that matter
to anyone such as in charitable actions).
People who are targets of altruism are in a position of depen-
dency with regard to accepting the given resource. Thus, the one
imparting the resource is vicariously rewarded. At the minimum,
they are in a one-up position if the altruism is perceived. It has
been stated that "appeals to altruism, like inducements, acknowl-
edge one's indebtedness to the other, thus offering him status
or power," (Blau, 1955:189). If this is true, the question then
involves deciding whether status or power is rewarding considering
that rewards and costs are difficult to analyze cross-situationally.
It was discussed how equilibrium may be an intervening
variable in determining perceptions of altruistic intentions. The
target of the altruism may try to reestablish equity if there was a
state of perceived equity before the altruist act or series of acts.
While altruistic behavior may not result in immediate reward on
the part of the "rewarder," there may be delayed payment as
weli as vicarious rewards. It is hoped - that future research en-
deavors will analyze altruism along with social exchange theory in
view of some of the hypotheses that were theoretically formulated
in this paper. As we learn more about such phenomena, we will
receive rewards in the form of gained knowledge by the fruits of
our own research.
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